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COMMENTS
LESSONS IN LAW FROM LITERATURE: A LOOK
AT THE MOVEMENT AND A PEER AT
HER JURY*
The law and literature movement' emerged, in part, as a response to the
widely proclaimed inadequacies of current legal education, as well as to the
perceived limitations in legal analysis. The law and literature movement is
at the cutting edge of contemporary legal thought. The presentation over
the last decade of several symposia devoted solely to law and literature,2 the
introduction of courses on the subject at a number of law schools,3 and the
considerable space devoted to commentary on the subject by law reviews and
* The title of this Comment is based on the short story, A Jury of Her Peers, written by
Susan Glaspell in 1917. The author utilizes A Jury of Her Peers in examining the law and
literature movement and its relevance to legal education.
1. The publication of James Boyd White's book, The Legal Imagination, has been identi-
fied as the germinative point in the law and literature movement. In this treatise, White recog-
nized the convergence of these two great fields and advocated the introduction of the study of
literature into legal education. See R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION 12 (1988).
Robin West, a professor of law and literature and frequent commentator, considers the law
and literature movement comparable in significance to the law and economics movement.
West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1988).
West observes the dichotomy between the fictitious legal character that she refers to as "liter-
ary woman," whose vision of human nature contrasts sharply with that of "economic man."
Id. While "economic man" is invariably and infallibly the "rational maximizer of his own
utility," in both the cognitive and motivational sense, "literary woman" has inexorable em-
pathetic capacity, enabling her to make "intersubjective comparisons of utility." Id. at 872. It
is within this defining trait that her contribution to the study and practice of law promises to
be great. See also White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto" 39 MERCER L. REV. 739
(1988) (recognizing the movement in spite of the fact that it is neither political nor uniformly
understood by its diverse proponents).
2. See, e.g., Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Symposium: Law
and Literature, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 603 (1979); Law and Southern Literature Symposium, 4
MIss. C. L. REV. 165 (1984); Law and Literature, 7 U. MD. L.F. 84 (1977); Law and Litera-
ture: A Symposium, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 223 (1976); Symposium: Law and Literature, 60
TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982).
3. The following universities are among those with a current course offering in law and
literature: Boston College Law School; The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law; Duke University, School of Law; Florida State University, College of Law; Georgia
State University, School of Law; Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law; New York
University, School of Law; University of California-Berkeley, School of Law; University of
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journals established for the purpose of exploring law and literature all testify
to the movement's growing importance.4
Indeed, distinguished legal scholars have been enticed by the provocative
appeal of this growing field. At least six books have been published on law
and literature since 1984.' One well-known legal scholar expresses serious
doubts regarding the direction the movement has taken, and seems to advo-
cate restricting the use of literature in the study of law in favor of a reasser-
tion of the already familiar economics approach to the law.6 However,
Chicago, School of Law; University of Iowa, College of Law; University of Notre Dame, Notre
Dame Law School; and Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
4. See, e.g., YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES; CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE.
5. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 13 n.28; R. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN
AMERICAN CULTURE (1984); B. THOMAS, CROSS-EXAMINATIONS OF LAW AND LITERA-
TURE: COOPER, HAWTHORNE, STOWE, AND MELVILLE (1987); R. WEISBURG, THE FAIL-
URE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION (1984); J. WHITE,
HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); J. WHITE,
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LAN-
GUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984).
6. In his book, Judge Posner accuses proponents of the field of distorting literature and
literary theory in order to create an artificial relevance to the law. See R. POSNER, supra note
1, at 13. Judge Posner argues, for example, that law as portrayed in great works is not "law-
yer's law." Id. at 15. While it provides a metaphorical framework for transmitting the au-
thor's ideas about enduring principles, it does not depend upon the lawyer's professional
knowledge; therefore, it has no point of peculiar interest for the lawyer. Id.
Posner also attacks the attempt some legal scholars have made to transpose, with some
alteration, the established techniques of literary criticism for use in statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation. Id. at 17. He asserts that both the purpose and the form of literary text
are so unlike those of statutes and constitutions that the borrowing of literary techniques for
legal analysis is a dangerous occupation. Id. He further undermines the movement with his
assertion that a lawyer or judge can gain a "valuable supplementary perspective" on the law by
stressing the antipodal distinctions between law and literature inasmuch as "the ability to
make distinctions is as important to knowledge as the ability to make connections." Id. at 353.
Although Posner finds promise in the law and literature movement as a tool for teaching
lawyers rhetorical techniques such as precision and style in the craft of writing, he quickly
reminds the reader that these lessons can be extracted from the study of alternate fields related
to communications and language theory, thereby minimizing the particular contribution of
literature to law. Id. at 356; see also Posner, Law and Literature.- A Relation Reargued, 72 VA.
L. REV. 1351 (1986); cf Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and
Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777, 779 (1988) [hereinafter Fish, Don't Know Much About the Mid-
dle Ages]. In responding to Posner, Law and Literature, A Relation Reargued, Fish agrees
with Posner's basic assertion that the study of literature does little to illuminate the interpreta-
tion of statutes and constitutions. Fish strongly disagrees, however, with Judge Posner's rea-
soning. Id. at 777. He accuses Posner of attempting to do little more than secure the authority
of economics, Posner's own area of scholarship, in legal education. Id. at 788-93. Specifically,
Fish rejects Posner's distinction between legal text, which requires an understanding of origi-
nal intent, and literary text for which an unconstrained interpretation is tolerable; nor does he
accept the consequences of assuming that distinction exists. Fish states that "interpretation
cannot proceed independent of intention, [and] that intentions are themselves interpretively
produced and therefore cannot serve ... as a check on interpretive activity." Id. at 779. While
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many other voices herald the emergence of this movement as an innovative
and compelling perspective on law and legal education.7
To many unacquainted with the movement, law and literature seem al-
most mutually exclusive enterprises. Certainly, a legal work and a literary
work are at once distinguishable. Legal scholars have not yet fully explored
or resolved the issues arising from the distinct characteristics of legal and
literary works that they face when attempting to integrate literature and lit-
Posner premises his position on the belief that text has an inherent nature that dictates the
approach to reading and understanding it, Fish believes that all texts acquire meaning only
within cultural assumptions that do not remain static, but that predispose the reader to apply a
particular interpretive strategy, either one deemed appropriate for legal text, or one deemed
appropriate for literary text. Id. at 778. The interpretive imperatives vary as the cultural
framework of the reader varies. The present culture dictates that lawyers read "in a way
designed to resolve interpretive crises" while readers of literature read "in a way designed to
multiply interpretive crises." Id. at 787. Therefore, in the present culture, a lawyer has little
to gain professionally from a novelist. Id.; see also Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325,
1344-45 (1984) [hereinafter Fish, Fish v. Fiss]. While according to Posner, the essential nature
of literary and legal texts will keep them forever separate species, Fish retains the possibility
that in a different cultural context, literary and legal text might converge, making the two
mutually relevant.
7. See, e.g., White, "hat Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature? (Book Review), 102
HARv. L. REV. 2014 (1989) (reviewing R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDER-
STOOD RELATION (1988)). White finds that everything Posner posits in his book is fundamen-
tally misguided because it rests on a conception of language (and by extension law and
literature) which is scientific, even mechanistic. Posner's view, writes White, "denies the spe-
cial character of literary discourse," id. at 2016, which is
not propositional, but experiential and performativeInot language-free, but language-
bound and language-centered; not reducible to other terms - especially not to logi-
cal outline or analysis - but expressing their meanings through their form; not
bound by the rule of noncontradiction but eager to embrace competing or opposing
strains of thought; not purely intellectual, but affective and constitutive, and in this
sense integrative, both of the composer and of the audience, indeed in a sense of the
culture in which they work. Texts of this sort are not coercive of their reader, but
invitational: they offer an experience, not a message, and an experience that will not
merely add to one's stock of information but change one's way of seeing and being, of
talking and acting.
Id. at 2018. According to White, Posner's scientific disposition blinds him to the reality of
other languages and language itself, and makes him oblivious to the most important possibili-
ties of literary texts for lawyers - namely, teaching them how to rethink, critique and reform
their own "habits of mind and language" by reading textual expression as "a form of cultural,
ethical, and political action, as constitutive of conmunity and character." Id. at 2023-24.
Literature stimulates "our capacity to imagine other people ... as they inhabit different uni-
verses of meaning, different spheres of language." Id. at 2036.
Posner, White asserts, explores only "how far our habitual scientific - or 'scientistic' -
methods of talk (and especially the language of economics) can extend over discourses, and
texts, written on quite different premises." Id. at 2029. Posner fails to "reflect the movement,
the sense of opposition and paradox, that typically gives humanistic texts their particular
value, which is, among other things, to confound the very part of us that wants to think in
propositions, arguments, and forced conclusions." Id. at 2036-37; see also West, supra note 1.
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erary techniques into the pool of legal materials and tools. Exponents of the
movement utilize the very qualities of literature, such as its experiential
character, that cause skeptics to challenge the wisdom of incorporating liter-
ature into the study of law. The movement's range and dimensions shift
dynamically as the scholars dispute the relevance of legal insight which liter-
ature can uniquely generate and literature's potential for altering established
authoritative frameworks for legal interpretation.
The diversity of viewpoints on the role of literature in the practice and
study of law attests to the richness of literature as a source for legal discus-
sion. This Comment briefly surveys several concepts that have come into
focus in the field of law and literature. It then discusses the identified con-
cepts' potential for further development and use in legal discourse. Next,
this Comment examines a selected piece of literature for its relevance to legal
education. This Comment concludes by inviting the reader to participate in
this current discussion and to formulate his or her own conceptions about
the interdisciplinary utility of literature to law.
I. LITERATURE'S ROLE IN DISCERNING A MORAL VISION OF LAW
A. "Masks of the Law"
Few challenge the general utility of humanistic discourse to the contempo-
rary student or practitioner of law.8 This utility derives from the fact that
the law, by its very nature, does not exist as an autonomous enterprise. 9
Legal disputes and problems may involve or concern virtually every facet of
human existence. Hence, legal thinkers naturally should continue to aug-
ment and reformulate their understanding of the human condition and of
society in an effort to achieve a more inclusive perspective.
The poverty of legal education stems from the fact that, with rare excep-
tion, authoritative legal text in the form of cases, statutes, and rules form the
sole foundation for the law student's instruction. At best, only incidental
reference is made to the rich cultural context in which the law operates.
Furthermore, the great majority of cases that law students encounter are
appellate-level decisions which are devoid of factual issues. This factor con-
tributes to the disconnection of legal study from the cultural environment.
To fill the void between traditional law school curriculum and the richness
of actual legal situations, legal education has taken an increasingly interdis-
8. See generally M. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, Hu-
MANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS (1981); J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
9. See generally Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
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ciplinary turn in recent years.' 0 For instance, lawyers found that economics
and the other social sciences complement legal education." However, the
social sciences do not provide the guiding principles necessary to wrestle
adequately the frequent moral questions or cross-cultural dilemmas that
arise in the context of the law. 2 Just as the law refers to the social sciences
for relevant sociological data and theory, so too, it must maintain open dia-
logue with the disciplines, such as literature, which help inform and enliven
the inquiry challenging and directing the moral basis of the law. Without
the continual reaffirmation, or reformulation when necessary, of the moral
values that direct the law, the citizens become slaves to the law, rather than
the sovereigns of it, and the law prematurely thwarts the evolution toward
the ideal of perfect justice.
Formal legal text alone cannot adequately assist the legal thinker who
inquires into the moral basis of the law. Official codifications of "moral prin-
ciples," such as the American Bar Association (ABA) Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics,' 3 the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility,'" and
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,' 5 fail to inspire an adequate
appreciation of legal ethics' 6 and do not impart an understanding of jus-
tice. 17 Statutes and judicial opinions can provide an historical record of the
moral principles endorsed by legislatures and judges, but an external gauge
is needed to evaluate these endorsements.
10. Id. at 766-77. The recent turn toward an interdisciplinary approach might be more
appropriately termed a "return" to the approach taken during the Renaissance. See M. GIL-
MORE, HUMANISTS AND JURISTS: SIX STUDIES IN THE RENAISSANCE (1963); Schoeck, The
Aesthetics of the Law, 28 AM. J. JURIS. 46, 48 n.9 (1983); White, supra note 7, at 2015 n.3.
11. Posner, supra note 9, at 767-68.
12. See Anshaw, The Rebirth of the Renaissance Lawyer, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1989, at
17-18. "[T]his interdisciplinary meshing of law with literature ... [is a response to the] 'failure
of the social science model, from the realization that law can't be reduced to a scientific or
bureaucratic system.' " Id. at 18 (quoting J.B. White); see also O'Brien, Of Judicial Myths,
Motivations & Justifications: A Postscript of Social Science and the Law, 64 JUDICATURE 285
(1981); O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary.- Social Science and the Courts, 64 JUDICA-
TURE 8 (1980).
13. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1975).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
16. Shaffer, infra note 30, at 878-79.
17. True justice, as it is used in this Comment, is the goal of the legal system. It includes
the notions of equality and dignity of all human beings, as well as proportionate reciprocity or
fairness. It is predicated upon the opportunity for full participation of each member of society
in the legal system and a public moral commitment to truth. See generally D. GRANFIELD,
THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF THE LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY at 85-126
(1988). David Granfield is a Professor in the Columbus School of Law at the Catholic Univer-
sity of America, specializing in Criminal Law and Jurisprudence.
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In a democracy, the moral values reflected in the law ideally should com-
port with the moral values of the community on whose behalf, and by whose
mandate, the state exercises power and authority. The political process pro-
vides the forum for competing partisan interests and faces the constant siege
of an unmanageable plurality of those interests. A paradox results because
the cross-fire of interests shatters public discourse capable of articulating an
underlying public moral vision of law. Literature, and art in general, on the
other hand, rises above partisan interests and brings into public discourse
insight as to the moral commitment of the whole community. Furthermore,
literature expresses the moral experience of the community from a perspec-
tive that incorporates the integral existential experience of individuals. Be-
cause literature communicates moral insights within the context of a story
about particular people, it can bring to public attention the particular plight
of the politically enfeebled, marginalized, and neglected segments of society.
In this way, literature at once speaks for the many and for the few. Yet,
until recently literature remained excluded from legal education and
discussion.
Legal practitioners and law students alike have shared the lament over a
perceived deficiency in legal education and legal analysis. Current estab-
lished methods of legal analysis, informed as they are by the dominant legal
culture and isolated from the wealth of vision expressed in other great hu-
manistic disciplines such as literature, contribute to the stagnation of the
law.
Since the middle of this century, the law's inability to meet human needs
and to preserve human dignity has prompted growing dissatisfaction.' 8 This
dissatisfaction is likely a significant contributor to the disillusionment of
large numbers of practicing attorneys reported to be leaving the profession in
search of more morally gratifying labor.' 9 One Ninth Circuit judge uses the
metaphor "masks of the Law"'20 to refer to the stony legal abstractions
which deny the full moral participation of the legal subject and which he
implies are ultimately and fundamentally inhuman.2' The law can shed the
18. Id. at 28-36.
19. See Brand, How Can We Know the Dancer from the Dance? (Book Review), 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1018, 1028 n.60 (1989) ("'[a]s many people are now abandoning the law
annually - roughly 40,000 -as entering it' ") (quoting Margolick, Alienated Lawyers Seeking -
and Getting - Counsel in Making the Transition to Other Careers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1989, at
B7, col. 1); Anshaw, supra note 12 (noting a general "hunger" for humanistic disciplines
among current law school students, as contrasted to the common image of the law school
"yuppie" in search for the $60,000 starting salary).
20. D. GRANFIELD, supra note 17, at 35-36 (quoting J. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND
MASKS OF THE LAW 20 (1976)).
21. Id. at 36. Commenting on the "mask" metaphor, David Granfield writes:
[Vol. 39:557
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masks only when it is fundamentally animated by the evolving moral vision
of the whole community and when it protects the dignity of all members of
that community. Literature uniquely articulates the public moral vision and
registers the concrete experiences of the individuals who might otherwise be
discounted. Literature, thus, could help to transform the legal mask into a
living face.
B. The Face of Literature
Some forms of expression convey direct human experience and illuminate
the nuances of daily existence. Ultimately, these devices generate a concep-
tion of the commonality of all human beings and thereby contribute to a
conception of true justice. Literature is such a vehicle.2 2 The experiential
The mask accurately and dramatically symbolizes the abstract, mechanical, and
theoretical approach to persons, which the law so easily and so often adopts ...
Without [responding to the subjectivity of others] there is no love, and, without love,
the law congeals into a deadly formalism.
The turn to the subject has begun to prompt thinkers to look outside their abstract
domains at the concrete data of human life.
Id.
22. See, e.g., Schoeck, supra note 10. Schoeck states "some forms of art are especially
structured or equipped to present antitheses, renderings of opposing values or positions; and
these artistic forms have been especially attracted to the law and attractive for dealing with
legal problems." Id. at 53. The author goes on to present numerous examples of drama, the
novel, the detective story, and the poem, which deal with the multiplicity of human experience
with the law, and which Schoeck suggests would be well worth the lawyer's reading. Id. at 53-
56. See also Daube, Greek Forerunners of Simenon, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 301 (1980); Gewirtz,
Aeschylus' Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1043 (1988); Koffier, Capital in Hell: Dante's Lesson on
Usury, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 608 (1979); Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in
Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279 (1987); Miller, Avoiding Legal
Judgment: The Submission of Disputes to Arbitration in Medieval Iceland, 28 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 95 (1984); Weisburg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd,
Sailor With An Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1982); West, Authority,
Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka
and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985). But cf R. POSNER, supra note 1. Judge
Posner devotes more than 50% of his text to a treatment of literature on legal themes, but
neglects to discuss the body of literature that is wholly unrelated to law. The narrowly focused
treatment suggests that Judge Posner does not see the relevance to legal education of literature
that is not about law. See White, supra note 7. Judge Posner's
first section, 'Literature on Legal Themes,' assumes, as its title suggests, that litera-
ture is a form of discourse that has a subject about which it speaks and upon which it
offers information or opinion. But this is not how literature works: not by offering us
findings, as though it were a kind of social or natural science, but by engaging the
mind in certain ways, and transforming it. To do this in ways that help the lawyer it
need not be on 'legal themes' at all. The interesting question is not what the 'field' of
literature has to teach the 'law,' but what meaning and value a literary education can
have for the person who is learning and practicing law - a question that can have no
programmatic or automatic answer, but depends on the response of the individual
mind.
Id. at 2028 (footnotes omitted).
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quality of literary texts makes literature a more effective tool for developing
conceptions of justice, and articulating a public morality, than either the
empirical social sciences 23 or analytic philosophy.24 The value of law lies
not in abstractions, but in its capacity to respond to extrinsic realities.25 The
law and literature movement reveals a frustration with the narrow language
of the social sciences and analytic philosophy - disciplines which tend to
lead us further away from the extrinsic realities and deeper into the ab-
stract.26 While these disciplines will always remain highly useful to law,
they do not provide a direct encounter with the concrete experience of daily
living which literature uniquely achieves, particularly through its narrative
form."
Literature offers the reader the opportunity to experience intimately an-
other human being whose perspective may not be familiar. This experience
is not restatable or reducible to mere fact which can augment the body of
social science data.2' The reader of a novel is a creative participant in the
inner experience of the protagonist, gaining intimate knowledge about the
protagonist's history, joys, frustrations, agonies, reasons, and irrationali-
ties.29 In this way, literature allows the reader to perceive, perhaps as never
before, a transcendant sense of the common bonds of all human beings. The
story's universal message unfurls within the context of the particular story
and thereafter is transferable to the particular events of other stories or life
situations. By reading literature, the lawyer can learn to recognize the famil-
iar human needs, hopes, and hurts in the unfamiliar situations of the people
23. For an attempt to bring the private moral debate into public discourse through the use
of social science, see R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWINDLER, & S. TIPTON,
HABITS OF THE HEART (1986).
24. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984) (hypothesizing that grave fragmen-
tation characterizes the language of morality today, and that current analytical philosophy will
not restore moral order because analytical philosophy essentially only describes the language
of morality which has itself become void of moral substance).
25. Commenting on the relative usefulness of abstractions and insights drawn from the
experiences of life, Bernard Lonergan writes: "Add abstraction to abstraction and one never
reaches more than a heap of abstractions. But add insight to insight and one moves to mastery
of all the eventualities and complications of a concrete situation." B. LONERGAN, A THIRD
COLLECTION: PAPERS BY BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, S.J. 104 (F. Crowe, S.J., ed. 1985)
[hereinafter B. LONERGAN].
26. See White, supra note 7, at 2015 n.3, 2026; see also Weisburg, supra note 22.
27. See White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV.
415, 420 & n.7 (1982). "It is indeed something of a critical truism that the meaning of a
literary work is not in its message but in the experience it offers its reader." Id. at 420.
28. See id. at 433; White, supra note 7, at 2019.
29. Shaffer, infra note 30, at 880-82; see also White, supra note 7, at 2019-20.
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he represents. Reading literature can also increase the lawyer's sensitivity
for legal ethics.3"
Justice requires that the law adequately respond to all classes of individu-
als that it purports to represent. As a precondition to this unitary response,
lawyers must understand the differing perspectives of all classes of persons.
Lawyers' own ingrained biases and the law's infusion with the prevailing
world view circumscribe interpretive judgment and thereby impede under-
standing. An insight into justice can only be gained, and then implemented,
if class biases are set aside.3 1 Reading literature will help the lawyer to rec-
ognize those prejudices to which, as social beings, we are all susceptible and
which we are inclined to dismiss or may fail to discern at all.3 2 In leading
the reader beyond the horizons of limited personal experience, literature pro-
vides essential education for anyone assuming public responsibility to make
decisions that will profoundly impact on the lives of others.
Where literature exposes the realities of an historically underrepresented
or unrepresented class of persons, such as women, minorities, or the handi-
capped, the importance of reading literature for lawyers becomes particu-
larly acute. Literature vividly communicates the voices of these classes,
30. See generally Shaffer, Christian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics, 33 MER-
CER L. REV. 877 (1982).
Stories help us make... [moral] judgments because the point of a story is something
we find for ourselves and apply in our own lives. The point is found in one story and
applied in another; it is transferable and objective, and therefore is a way to teach,
learn about, ponder and practice legal ethics.
Id. at 887-88; "The most persistently useful textbook ... in teaching legal ethics is Harper
Lee's novel To Kill a Mockingbird." Id. at 879.
31. Bernard Lonergan writes:
Growth, progress, is a matter of situations yielding insights, insights yielding policies
and projects, policies and projects transforming the initial situation, and the trans-
formed situation giving rise to further insights that correct and complement the defi-
ciencies of previous insights. . . . But this wheel of progress becomes a wheel of
decline when the process is distorted by bias. Increasingly the situation becomes, not
the cumulative product of coherent and complementary insights, but the dump in
which are heaped up the amorphous and incompatible products of all the biases of
self-centered and shortsighted individuals and groups.
B. LONERGAN, supra note 25, at 105.
32. White, supra note 7. Professor White notes:
Reading texts composed by other minds in other worlds can help us see more clearly
(what is otherwise nearly invisible) the force and meaning of the habits of mind and
language in which we have been brought up, as lawyers and as people, and to which
we shall in all likelihood remain unconscious unless led to perceive or imagine other
worlds .... [W]e can hope to find in [humanistic texts] a ground for the criticism of
our own world, of our own texts, and of our own relations with others.
Id. at 2023. Professor White demonstrates his proposition with a discussion of Huckleberry
Finn and the language of slavery that dominates the world of its characters. Id. at 2023-24.
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which traditionally have been muffled or co-opted by the legal system.3 3
Literature can awaken lawyers to the possibilities of otherwise suppressed
legal alternatives which might suggest more inclusive solutions to the press-
ing legal problems of the underrepresented.
The law rests upon assumptions about the fundamental nature of human
experience which reflect the perspective of the dominant legal culture, but
these assumptions are neither adequate nor universally agreed upon.34 For
33. For examples of literature exposing the minority experience and voicing the cry of the
dispossessed, consider the following writings of African American authors from the antibellum
period: W. WELLS BROWN, CLOTEL (1853) (written by an ex-slave about the problems of the
fugitive slave in southern states, likening their experience to refugees from foreign lands); F. J.
WEBB, THE GARIES AND THEIR FRIENDS (1857) (detailing the African American experience
in Philadelphia); H. E. WILSON, OUR NIG; OR SKETCHES FROM THE LIFE OF A FREE BLACK
(1859) (an African American woman who was an indentured servant in New England explores
the hypocracy of purported legal reform advocates). Examples of similar writings about the
African American experience during the early 20th century include: C. W. CHESNUTT, THE
COLONEL'S DREAM (1905) (explores the caste system in the south); C. W. CHESNUTT, THE
MARROW OF TRADITION (1901) (regarding a famous race riot and the emergence of a caste
system under a segregationist state constitution); R. ELLISON, THE INVISIBLE MAN (1947)
(likening the personal experience of an African American man to a "disembodied voice"); R.
WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940) (a study of the racially prejudical workings of the criminal
justice system based upon an actual trial in Chicago). For literature emerging out of the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960's, consider: J. BALDWIN, BLUES FOR MISTER CHARLIE (1964)
(a play exploring race relations in the south); J. E. WIDEMAN, REUBEN (1987) (an African
American lawyer in Pittsburgh reveals the conditions of African Americans today). Utopian
novels voicing the feminist perspective include: L. WAISBROOKER, A SEX REVOLUTION
(1893) (19th century feminist challenges war, church, and state); A. WALKER, MERIDIAN
(1976) (explores the African American feminist's perspective of the Civil Rights movement).
For a unique literary critique of the criminal trial process of the early 1900's, see H. FAST,
THE PASSION OF SACCO AND VANZETrI (1953) (based on the actual murder trial in the early
1920's of two Italian-American anarchists). For examples of English authors, consider E.
ROBINS, THE CONVERT (1907); V. WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN (1929). For literary
accounts of the alienation of the handicapped, see J. R. COCKE, M.D., BLIND LEADERS OF
THE BLIND: THE ROMANCE OF A BLIND LAWYER (1896); M. J. WARD, THE SNAKE PIT
(1946) (life inside a mental institution during the early 20th Century). For literature reflecting
the realities of dysfunctional families, consider M. BARRE, THE CASE AGAINST THE ANDER-
SONS (1983) (a teenage girl sues her parents for denial of proper emotional care); E. BUNKER,
LITTLE BOY BLUE (1981) (how criminal justice institutions actually foster juvenile delin-
quency); J. GUEST, SECOND HEAVEN (1982) (about a custody battle in a broken home). For a
general anthology of the literature of social protest, see U. SINCLAIR, THE CRY FOR JUSTICE
(1963).
34. See, e.g., West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). The author
provides a matrix for understanding the basic differences between the dominant legal theory,
which is sometimes regarded as a masculine jurisprudence, and feminist legal theory or a femi-
nist jurisprudence. The basic differences are roughly as follows:
Liberal legalism, the dominant legal theory, asserts that persons value autonomy and the
separation of the individual from others. Because of this separation, and the fact that each
autonomous person pursues his or her own ends in a world of limited resources, each person
fears conflict with the other as well as the specter of annihilation by the other. The law is
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example, some feminists assert that the rule of law reflects the dominant
masculine culture of equality, rights, and distance from others, and under-
values the feminine values of intimacy, nurturance, and care.3 5 According
to such feminists, the law, as the creation of the dominant masculine culture,
is disproportionately unresponsive to the subjective experiences of women,
ignoring women's reasoning and insight, and is thereby oppressive.
3 6
Literature can prepare the lawyer to respond to diverse perspectives,3 7
such as those of feminists, by stimulating open dialogue about where the law
structured around a concept of "rights" which protect one's autonomy and prevent one's anni-
hilation. Liberal legalism most strongly advances the masculine perspective.
Critical legal theory also sees the individual as autonomous, but rather than celebrating that
autonomy, it views the individual as existing in a state of existential grief and longing for
communion with others. The greatest fear is isolation, not annihilation. Although the critical
legal studies movement attacks the established "masculine" legal institutions as exploitive, see
R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986), critical legal studies provides
the second prong of the masculine perspective.
By striking contrast, an assertion that women have an existential connection to others,
rather than a separation, underlies feminist legal theory. This dichotomy accounts for the
sharply contrasting world view of men and women. Pregnancy illustrates the paradigmatic
experience of physical connection. "Radical" and "cultural" feminists diverge only in their
accounts of the subjective experience of that connectedness. The cultural feminist sees women
valuing intimacy, nurturance, and developing an ethic of care, while dreading separation from
others. The natural proclivity for intimacy should not be confused with the critical legalist's
longing for connection. Connection is a natural state for women; men surreptitiously seek
connection to overcome their natural isolation.
While the cultural feminist celebrates the ethic of care, the radical feminist characterizes
connection to others as invasive and intrusive and longs for individuation and deliverance from
that state. This should not be confused with liberal legalism's assertion of self-autonomy. The
threat to the individual's autonomy arises in the context of competition over mutually desired
ends. The threat to individuation, a more subtle concept, arises when an individual's formula-
tion of self-purpose is frustrated or prematurely abandoned in order to assist the necessities of
other people.
The antipodal perspectives of men and women account for their differing moral voices. Men
develop a morality that respects equality, rights, and freedom. This is the moral code reflected
in the law, creating, as the feminist sees it, a patriarchy. Women develop a morality of nur-
turance and care that endures despite patriarchy's hostility to it.
For an explanation of the formation of a moral framework in little boys and girls, see C.
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (distinguishing the emergence of an "ethic of
rights" in boys and an "ethic of care" in girls). Id. at 164.
35. West, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. Some legal critics believe that the legal system is designed to eradicate perspectives
that diverge from the dominant culture and consequently will never have the capacity to re-
spond to or harmonize these divergent perspectives. See, e.g., Scales, The Emergence of a
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). According to Professor Scales:
Male and female perceptions of value are not shared, and are perhaps not even
perceptible to each other. In our current genderized realm, therefore, the 'rights-
based' and 'care-based' ethics cannot be blended. Patriarchal psychology sees value
as differently distributed between men and women: Men are rational, women are
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is unjust and unreflective of a publicly shared commitment to value, and how
it can be adjusted to mirror a unified moral vision.
II. READING LAW AS LITERATURE: LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF
LITERARY INTERPRETATION
A. Law as Interpretation
Language, specifically text, is central to both literature and law. Not
suprisingly, many legal critics have begun to explore the possibility of bor-
rowing established literary hermeneutic techniques to provide insight to
legal text." The deconstructionist school of literary interpretation currently
holds influence among some legal critics.39 These critics assert that the
not. Feminist psychology suggests different conceptions of value: Women are en-
tirely rational, but society cannot accommodate them because the male standard has
defined into oblivion any version of rationality but its own. Paradigmatic male val-
ues, like objectivity, are defined as exclusive, identified by their presumed opposites.
Those values cannot be content with multiplicity; they create the other and then
devour it. Objectivity ignores context; reason is the opposite of emotion; rights pre-
clude care. As long as the ruling ideology is a function of this dichotomization,
incorporationism threatens to be mere co-optation, a more subtle version of female
invisibility.
Id. at 1383 (footnotes omitted).
38. See Poster, Interpreting Texts: Some New Directions, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 15 (1985).
Poster outlines the various schools of textual interpretation. Poster identifies three categories:
a) Traditional method, which focuses on the author's intent and asserts that a unitary,
ascertainable meaning is implanted in the text by the author.
b) Structuralism, which asserts that meaning can be derived more from the structure of the
text than from the author's intent.
c) Poststructuralism, which asserts that the meaning of a text is not unitary and is a prod-
uct of the interaction of reader and text.
Id.
In addition, some scholars have identified a fourth category, deconstruction, which asserts
that meaning can be discerned as much by what is absent or repressed in the text as by what is
present. For further discussion of the deconstructionist school, see infra note 39.
39. See, e.g., Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
Balkin cites several other examples of legal critics commenting on or utilizing deconstruction.
Id. at 743 n.2. They are: Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1276, 1288-99 (1984); Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203
(1985); Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984); Tushnet,
Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law.: An Essay in Deconstruction. 36 STAN. L. REV.
623 (1984); Note, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Education, 34
AM. U.L. REV. 1141 (1985); Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Decon-
struction (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 209, 229-35 (1984).
Jacques Derrida, the French philosopher who proposed the philosophical practice of decon-
struction with regard to textual interpretation, developed his theory in several writings. Balkin
identifies them as J. DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (B. Johnson trans. 1981); J. DERRIDA, MAR-
GINS OF PHILOSOPHY (1982); J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976); J. DERRIDA, POSI-
TIONS (1981); J. DERRIDA, SPURS (1979); J. DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA (1973); J.
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methods of deconstructionism assist an understanding of how the rule of law
defines and constricts human beings, so that the critic may better evaluate
the law in terms of true justice. Notwithstanding controversies, legal critics
have applied two deconstructive practices to legal texts: the liberation of the
text from the author and the inversion of the hierarchies.' Both interpre-
tive techniques possess indisputable value.
1. The Liberation of the Text from the Author
The liberation of the text from the author questions the assumption that
interpretation should hinge on the preservation of an inherent meaning
placed in the text by the author.4 1 Courts of law often assert that correct
interpretation of a given case or statute must reflect the author's intent and
that insufficient attention to that intent will render the construction unau-
thoritative. The liberation of the text from the author challenges the way
judges and lawyers rely on the intent of the drafters of opinions or statutes to
legitimize a given interpretation.4 2 The deconstructionist notes that the
most important meaning in a text does not necessarily coincide with the
author's intent.43 To the contrary, the deconstructionist asserts that the
originally unintended meanings that are assigned to the text by subsequent
readers affirm the special quality of text and language in general, and are
therefore equally as important as the author's intent."
Recognizing that language is essentially the use of abstract symbols to
convey ideas, the deconstructionist asserts that intersubjective meaning is
only possible if those symbols have a public interpretation divorced from,
DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (1978); Derrida, The Law of Genre, 7 GLYPH 202
(1980); Derrida, Limited Inc abc ... , 2 GLYPH 162 (1977). See Balkin, supra, at 743 n.l.
For a discussion of deconstructionism in general, see Edmundson, The Ethics of Deconstruc-
tion, 27 MICH. Q. REV. 622 (1988).
For examples of legal critics who generally affirm the use of literary interpretive techniques
in legal criticism, see generally Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982),
stating: "[M]any more theories of interpretation have been defended in literature than in law,
and these include theories that challenge the flat distinction between description and evalua-
tion that has enfeebled legal theory." Id. at 530. See also R. DWORKIN, How Law is Like
Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985) (developing the metaphor of law as a chain
novel); Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 37 (1985); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. (1985); Symposium:
Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982). But cf R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 209-68
(for a discussion of Judge Posner's views on the law and literature movement, see supra note
6).
40. Balkin, supra note 39, at 746.
41. See generally Balkin, supra note 39, at 772-85.
42. Id. at 772-73 and 773 n.87.
43. Id. at 777-78.
44. Id. at 778-79.
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and not necessarily identical to, the intent of the author.45 This unique char-
acteristic liberates language to operate within unforeseen contexts. Meaning
becomes context-relative rather than bound by the author's intent.4 6 Ac-
cording to the deconstructionist, therefore, original intent does not provide a
sufficient basis for interpretation. The weight given to original intent in as-
sessing the meaning in text must be complemented by an acknowledgment of
the present reader's role in the interpretive process. 7 In law, this places
great import on each successive judge's interpretation.
2. The Inversion of the Hierarchies
In the alternative method, the inversion of the hierarchies, the critic iden-
tifies hierarchical oppositions in the law, such as the rule versus the excep-
tion, the present versus the absent, the apparent versus the inferred.4" The
critic then temporarily reverses the relationship of privilege, not in order to
replace established norms, but as an investigative technique to dissect and
evaluate the law, without the interference of habitual modes of categoriza-
tion and bias.49 In this way, the critic can demonstrate how each term of the
opposition depends on the other and therefore neither term can be primary
or dominant. 50
The deconstructionist demonstrates that established legal concepts result
from the prioritization of one concept over an equally plausible, inherent
opposite."1 By exposing this relationship between opposites in the legal sys-
tem through deconstruction, "we are brought to an entirely different vision
of moral and legal obligation."52 The rule of law reflects the privileging of a
particular social theory or interpretation of human nature which defines the
public moral vision and the common good.53 Laws privilege certain aspects
of our human nature over others.54 The deconstructionist legal critic shows
45. Id. at 779-80.
46. Id. at 780-81.
47. Jacques Derrida calls the relationship of mutual dependence between oppositions,
such as a textual interpretation bound by author's intent and one freed from author's intent,
the "differance." Deconstructionism does not favor one interpretation over the other, but
rather serves only to reveal that the interpretation privileged or dominant is incomplete with-
out its minority or non-dominant counterpart. See generally Balkin, supra note 39, at 751-55,
780.
48. Id. at 746-47.
49. Id.; see also id. at 748-51 (providing three illustrations of this deconstructive
technique).
50. Id. at 751.
51. Id. at 754.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 762.
54. Id.
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how the moral vision reflected in the law neglects or suppresses an equally
defensible countervision and that the two visions are mutually dependent."
Thus, the deconstructive technique provides a useful tool to advocates of
legal reform. For example, some feminists assert that men and women have
distinct approaches to moral and legal dilemmas.5 6 Such feminists contend
that while men value rights, autonomy, and separation, women value rela-
tionships and connections." These feminists seek to reveal the failure of the
dominant legal culture to reflect a complete and universally accepted con-
ception of fundamental human values. Feminists further assert that the rule
of law fails to recognize the values that flow from the unique experience of
women. Specifically, some feminists observe that while the rule of law pro-
tects against the danger of annihilation58 and the threat of physical harm
(dangers which are attendant to autonomy-a masculine value), it does not
fully acknowledge the threat to individuation59 (a danger which is attendant
to intimacy-a feminine value).'
3. An Application of the Deconstructionist Technique to Law
The criminal law concerning rape6" provides a ready example of the
privileging of one perspective over another and can be used to demonstrate
55. Id. at 762-63.
56. See West, supra note 34.
57. Id.
58. Robin West uses the term "annihilation" to describe "the official harm of liberal the-
ory." In a state of autonomy or separateness from others, human beings are naturally aggres-
sive and likely to frustrate each other's pursuit of individual ends. In an extreme case,
competition in a world of limited resources and opportunities could ultimately cause one per-
son to kill the other. West, supra note 34, at 7-9. This Comment adopts West's use of the term
"annihilation" to indicate any interference with a person's pursuit of personal objectives, up to
and including physical annihilation, imposed by another person who desires the same
objective.
59. Robin West describes the "unofficial" harm of a state of connectedness or intimacy
with others as the threat to "individuation." She writes that connection, as a natural state for
women, "invites invasion into the physical integrity of [women's] bodies, and intrusion into the
existential integrity of [women's] lives." West, supra note 34, at 15. This Comment adopts the
use of the term "threat to individuation" to indicate any threat by another of occupying or
displacing a person's own ends, but not in the same sense of displacement that occurs in a
competitive state. A threat to individuation occurs when one person's end subsumes another's
because of a pressing urgency, such as a child's total dependence on its caretaker. In other
words, a threat to individuation is a threat to rob one of a personally-defined end, rather than
to compete for a mutually desired end.
60. West, supra note 34, at 58-59.
61. The modem approach defines the crime of rape as unlawful sexual intercourse with
any person. Modem statutes use the phrases "without consent," see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1406 (1989), or "by forcible compulsion," see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-103
(1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040 (1988). Lack of consent or "constructive force"
is an essential element of the crime. Almon v. State, 21 Ala. App. 466, 109 So. 371 (1926).
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the deconstructionist technique. Some feminist legal critics characterize the
legal response to rape as denying, in practice, criminal sanction unless the
rape occurs in the context of some other physical harm indicating that the
victim faced a plausible threat of annihilation.62 Therefore, a rape that does
not display evidence of a determinable harm goes virtually unpunished,63
prejudicially affecting women, who overwhelmingly comprise the majority of
rape victims." These feminists contend that the law, in practice if not in
theory, does not adequately respond to victims who do not freely consent to
sexual intercourse, but who are coerced into submission by husbands, ac-
quaintances, or dates - circumstances where the law presumes consent.65
Feminist legal critics assert that a woman's perspective regarding force
differs radically from that of a man.66 A woman may experience the threat
of force in terms of invasion whether or not her attacker brutally beats her,
and long before "she has established to the satisfaction of a court of law that
she has 'really' not consented."'67 Many rape victims react to the terror of
sexual assault by freezing and complying with their attacker's demands.68
This choice not to resist, made by the victim under extreme duress, may
reduce the risk of further injury to the victim, but it also weakens the vic-
tim's ability to prove the crime of rape when a de facto requirement of physi-
cal force exists. 69 Feminists argue, therefore, that legal doctrines or legal
Actual force or intimidation evidences lack of consent. People v. LaSalle, 103 Cal. App. 3d
139, 162 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1980); State v. Schuster, 282 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1955); see also Smith v.
State, 161 Ga. 421, 131 S.E. 163 (1925) (mental incapacity); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West
1988) (fraud); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101.5 (1977) (insensibility).
62. West, supra note 34, at 59. See also S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); Scheppele, The
Re-Vision of Rape Law (Book Review), 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095 (1987). For an analysis of
arrest rates in major crime categories, see F.B.I., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1985); Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Con-
duct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 400-01 &
n.14 (1988) (stating that conviction rates for rape are very low compared to those for other
personal crimes due in part to the difficulty of proving lack of consent without some outward
manifestation of force).
63. West, supra note 34, at 59.
64. Note, supra note 62, at 401 & n.15.
65. See West, supra note 34, at 59; see also Note, supra note 62, at 402 n.24 (discussing the
marital exemption in rape law, which most jurisdictions continue to enforce); Comment, For
Better or for Worse: Marital Rape, 15 N. Ky. L. REV. 611 (1988).
66. Scheppele, supra note 62, at 1103.
67. Id.
68. See California Supreme Court Survey June 1986-August 1986, 14 PEPPERI4NE L.
REV. 453, 478-79 (1987).
69. Id.; see also Note, supra note 62, at 402 & n.22 ("Although force is not an actual
element of the crime, the evidence must show that force was used to accomplish sexual inter-
course in order to prove that the woman did not consent." (quoting R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAw 211 (3d ed. 1982))).
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practices that privilege the masculine perspective and subordinate the femi-
nine perspective, as does rape law, should be exposed as incomplete." °
The feminist could employ deconstructionism to achieve this exposure by
asserting that rape law, which in practice generally punishes a rape only
when combined with another act of physical brutality, does not protect wo-
men from rape at all. The fact that rape often occurs under circumstances
that lack physical force demonstrates this failure in the law.7 Therefore,
rape law, as applied, does not serve to protect women from the harm to
individuation which rape threatens, but rather acts to protect the autonomy
of human beings and to punish behavior that threatens annihilation.7 2
Having identified the privileged perspective, the feminist would proceed to
posit that rape, unlike most forms of assault and battery, is not fundamen-
tally a threat of annihilation, but is rather a threat to individuation.73 The
threat to individuation fundamentally characterizes rape and therefore justi-
fies the view that rape law should be grounded in an underlying right to
protect one's individuation. This position reflects distinctively feminine val-
ues and fears.7 4 In applying deconstructionist theory in the rape context,
individuation becomes temporarily privileged over autonomy, thereby ensur-
ing that rape will be recognizable in instances where no outward manifesta-
tions of brutality occur. By uncovering a dimension of rape that the law fails
to address adequately, the feminist brings to public consciousness the incom-
pleteness of the established approach to rape and generates new insight into
the crime. In addition, the feminist legal critic has suggested a different "vi-
70. Scheppele, supra note 62, at 1102-03, in her review of Estrich's book, Real Rape,
points out that although there has been some move to reform the wording of rape statutes in
order to shift the focus from the victim (which resulted in painful interrogations of the victim
about her sexual reputation) to the defendant, courts have not entirely relinquished a distrust
of women who claim rape. See also Note, supra note 62; Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape
Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335 (1973). For cases that demonstrate past
distrust of women's accounts of rape, see Gordon v. State, 32 Ala. App. 398, 400, 26 So. 2d
419, 421 (1946) (finding implied consent by the victim because she had been drinking); People
v. DeFrates, 33 Ill. 2d 190, 196, 210 N.E.2d 467, 470 (1965) (dismissing a rape charge as an
expression of the woman's guilty conscience). For examples of efforts to reform rape law, see
People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110 (1986) (clarifying the 1980
Amendment to section 261 of the California Penal Code, which omitted the requirement of
physical resistance); State v. Gray, 497 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (omitting physi-
cal resistance where the victim fears physical violence).
71. See, e.g., Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110 (the victim showed
substantial fear but exchanged kisses with her attacker).
72. See generally West, supra note 34, at 58-61.
73. Id. at 60-61.
74. Id.
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sion of moral and legal obligation.",75 The deconstructionist technique has
assisted the feminist legal critic to bring to the fore suppressed possibilities.
In the rape example, incorporating the new insight into legal practice
raises problems of proof that could limit the law's ability to accede to the
feminine perspective. Nevertheless, the literary technique has maintained a
channel of open dialogue and inquiry into the moral values that direct the
law.
B. Law as Imperative
The law and literature movement proposes that the science of textual in-
terpretation has interdisciplinary utility and that it is worthwhile to explore
the congruous elements of literary and legal hermeneutics because the for-
mer is likely to illuminate the latter.76 However, the concomitant difficulties
that limit the analogue of law and literature must also be considered.
Literary critics are divided about the general nature of textual interpreta-
tion.7 7 The disagreement centers on whether interpretation is, by nature,
purely objective, purely subjective, or has elements of both. The objective
interpretivists believe that meaning lodges in the text itself.78 Objective in-
terpretivists view interpretation as rational and objective because they be-
lieve the written text holds a determinate meaning. 79 At the opposite pole
75. Balkin, supra note 39, at 754. For another good example of legal deconstruction, see
Balkin's discussion of contractual obligations. Id. at 767-72.
76. This is part of a more general trend, sometimes called "the linguistic turn," according
to which a priority is given to interpretation over abstract theory in addressing questions of
philosophy, theology and law. See H. GODAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975); H.
GODAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 25 (1976) (where the author writes of the
"universality of hermeneutic reflection" based on "the universality of human linguisticality as
a limitless medium"). Ronald Dworkin's attempt to articulate an understanding of "law as
integrity" presents a major recent example of this trend in legal scholarship. See R. DWOR-
KIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
77. See, e.g., infra notes 78, 79, 81.
78. West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-Litera-
ture Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 210-214 (1987).
79. Id. at 206. See, e.g., Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982).
Dworkin states that in order to distinguish interpreting a text from changing it, the identity of
the text must be preserved through the concept of a "canonical text." Id. at 531. Dworkin
states that "all the words must be taken account of and none may be changed to make 'it' a
putatively better work." Id. Both the literary and legal analyst engage in discovering the
"best" reading of this canonical text, but the written word severely constrains their activity.
Id. Strictly speaking, the meaning these analysts assign cannot be said to be determinate in the
sense that there can be only one objective interpretation; nor, however, can the interpretation
be wholly subjective inasmuch as it is a link in the chain of institutional history. Institutional
rules and principles shape interpretation. Id. at 542-43. Normative theories (both in art and in
law) will inform a judgment about which interpretation is "best." In literature, such a judg-
ment will depend primarily on how broadly the reader conceives the purpose and function of
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stands the subjectivist view that texts are void of any fixed meaning 0 and
fluctuate according to each individual reader's response. The pure subjectiv-
ist view, therefore, could present endless possibilities of meaning, with one
reader's interpretative response superimposed over an equally defensible al-
ternative response, followed by another's inversion of it and counter-inver-
sion ad infinitum, leading potentially to nihilism.8 As the rape example
art. Id. at 532. In law, the interpretation will depend on a broad legal philosophy or political
theory. Id. at 545. The convictions about the function and value of either art or law will
"tutor and constrain" the interpretation. Id. To address the fact that any one person's inter-
pretation will encounter opposition, a "useful conception of interpretation must contain a doc-
trine of mistake." Id. at 544. See also Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV.
739, 744-45 (1982) (arguing that "disciplining rules," derived from the specific institutional
context, whether legal or literary, serve to clarify ambiguities in the text by severely limiting
the interpreter's subjectivity). These disciplining rules provide the basis by which to make an
interpretive judgment, thereby rendering the interpretive process objective. White, supra note
27 (arguing that one may establish a meaning that is virtually objective, even if not in the
absolute sense). But cf Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Litera-
ture, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982) (claiming that Dworkin falls into the very fallacies of both
pure objectivism and pure subjectivism which he attempted to impugn). Id. at 552; see also
Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note 6, at 1328 (claiming Fiss' theory of disciplining rules untenable
because "rules... do not stand in an independent relationship to a field of action on which
they can simply be imposed... they make sense only in reference to the very regularities they
are thought to bring about."). Because rules themselves require an interpretive fore notion,
they cannot constrain interpretation. Id. at 1332; Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 373, 401 (1982) (asserting that Fiss' position is fundamentally flawed because the "united
interpretive community" which is implicitly necessary to support Fiss' theory "simply does not
exist"); cf Fish, infra note 81.
80. West, supra note 78, at 244.
81. See, e.g., Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX. L. REV. 495 (1982)
(arguing that interpretation is as evasive as there are differing points of view). No principle
holds precedence over any other perspective by virtue of its own enduring value because
"[t]here are no principles above interest, only principled interests." Id. at 498. The dominance
of one interest or interpretive perspective over another results simply from the strength of
persuasion. If a particular interpretation ever achieves general acceptance, it is not because of
its general disinterested rationality but because "an act of persuasion has been so successful
that the rationality it urges has been generally accepted." Id. No interpretation exists outside
the context of someone's perspective, therefore, no interpretation is enduring. Neither literary
text nor legal text can be detached from its readers and "turn[ed]... into the kind of text that
speaks to all men in all circumstances." Id. at 503. There is no finality to interpretation, but
meaning can be constructed by readers acting within the context of a moment in history, from
a particular perspective. Id.; see Levinson, supra note 79, at 377 (asserting that written text,
and words in general, have no absolute and constant referents and that meaning derives only
from the exchange between reader and text and is therefore unstable); see also S. FISH, IS
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 327 (1980) (stating, "[i]nterpretation is not the art of constru-
ing but the art of constructing"); Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Age4 supra note 6;
Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note 6; Fish, supra note 79; West, supra note 78 at 206 & n. 10. Levin-
son differs from Fish in that while Fish believes that privileging of perspectives is a matter of
persuasion, Levinson conceives of a language that transcends all perspectives, but which is
presently unavailable. See Fish, supra note 81; cf Graff, "Keep off the Grass," "Drop Dead,"
and Other Indeterminacies: A Resp6nse to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405 (1982); see
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above shows, when taken to an extreme, the unresolvable deconstructionist
insights could yield a cataclysm of subjectivity.
The interpretation controversy raises a serious question concerning the
extent to which literary criticism is adaptable to legal criticism. In whatever
manner the objectivist/subjectivist controversy is resolved in literary criti-
cism, in law there are special constraints on interpretation. One federal cir-
cuit judge and commentator on the law and literature movement recently
observed:
Law presupposes a degree of uniformity that would be otiose in
cultural affairs. For a literary critic to propose a startling new
reading of a work of literature is harmless, and often healthy. But
if every lawyer and judge felt free to imprint his own personal read-
ing on any statute, chaos would threaten. s2
The constraints on interpretation in the legal context derive from the na-
ture of adjudication and the consequences of interpretation within the adju-
dicatory process."3 If an ascertainable, positive meaning exists within legal
text itself, then the interpretive activity lends the adjudicative process the
power of rational persuasion.84 "Obedience to an authoritative legal text"
solves the problem of unrestrained personal or partisan political power be-
cause judges would be compelled by reason to render the objectively deter-
minate interpretation of the law at issue.8 5 Adjudication becomes an act of
"civil obedience," 6 curtailing flexibility and moral maturation in the devel-
opment of the law.
To justify the morality of the legal text, and accordingly, adjudicatory
power, the modern objectivist supplements the interpretation of legal text
with society's conventional morality. 7 The modern objectivist asserts that
adjudication "by virtue of its substantive supplementation and its procedural
generally R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1982); Tushnet, Introduc-
tion, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239 (1984) (asserting that
all rules are indeterminate and therefore all judicial decisionmaking is subjective).
82. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 242.
83. See West, supra note 78, at 206-07.
84. Id. at 206.
85. Id. at 212 (emphasis omitted).
86. Id. at 213.
87. Id. at 215.
[O]bjectivists have rejected an identification of the 'text' to be obeyed with either
original intent or literal meaning, and have carved out instead a third alternative: the
'text' (including the constitutional text) which can morally purify judicial power, and
the interpretation of which constitutes the core of adjudication, must embrace soci-
ety's conventional morality. This position might be called 'supplementalism'.
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discipline . . . is a morally justified practice.""8 The manifest problem
with this objectivist interpretation construct is that it ties the morality of
adjudication to the contemporary strain of moral relativism, guarantee-
ing neither true morality nor true justice.89 The privileging phenomenon of
deconstructionism could reveal the incompleteness of this approach.
The conscious justification of evil and oppressive practices in the law at
various points in history, have devastated, in turn, women,90 the un-
born, 9 1 the poor,92 African Americans and Hispanics,93 Native Ameri-
88. Id. at 217.
89. See, e.g., id. at 219-44 (West uses a piece of literature, Mark Twain's Pudd'n Head
Wilson, to illustrate the folly of the objective interpretive strategy in legal analysis).
90. The notion that women are naturally subordinate to men prevailed frequently in
American legal history. Prior to the mid-19th century, the common law ranked the married
woman as "something better than [her husband's] dog, a little dearer than his horse." See
Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and
Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1044-70 (1972). Women were
barred from entering the legal profession. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130
(1873) (affirming denial of application for a license to practice law based solely on the fact that
the applicant was female); see also In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (holding that a wo-
man is not a "person" within the meaning of a state attorney licensing statute). Equal protec-
tion and due process challenges made in the 20th century also have reflected the Court's
"benign preference" for women based on women's presumed inherent inferiority. See, e.g.,
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a state statute that restricted the number of
hours women could work in certain establishments); see also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961) (upholding a state statute that provided women with the right, but not the duty, to
serve on juries), overruled, Taylor v. Lousiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a state statute that allowed women to work as waitresses, but not
bartenders); supra notes 62, 65, 70.
91. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (inval-
idating those sections of a state ordinance that required parental consent, informed consent, a
24-hour waiting period, and "humane and sanitary" disposal of fetal body parts); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (creating a right of privacy that virtually granted a pregnant wo-
man the unconditional right to abortion, and holding that a human fetus is not a "person"
within the meaning of the Constitution).
92. Public assistance for the poor in the United States is low by comparison to assistance
levels common in Western Europe. See M. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 271 (1986). For cases illuminating the problem
of discrimination against the poor, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (where city refused to rezone so as not to preclude construc-
tion of low-income housing); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (poor minority and ap-
plicants for public housing sued the Chicago Housing Authority and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to remedy a discriminatory policy allegedly designed to
keep minorities out of white neighborhoods); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (plaintiffs'
suit dismissed for lack of standing in action to remedy injury from alleged discriminatory
zoning practices of defendant small town).
93. Even after the passage of the thirteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XIII, Afri-
can Americans endured lingering effects from the evils of slavery. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hack-
ney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding a state welfare program that disproportionately assisted
White beneficiaries over African American and Hispanic beneficiaries); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (constitutionally validating racial segregation under a "separate but
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cans,94 the handicapped,95 and children.96 This list testifies to the fallacy of
moral relativism with its pernicious legal sequel.
Similarly, the subjective approach to legal interpretation becomes prob-
lematic when extended logically to the adjudicative process. If a text lacks
all determinacy, interpretation necessarily becomes irrational and subjective.
It follows then that adjudication, likewise, becomes irrational and subjec-
tive97 and "is really an act of [political] power rather than an act of under-
standing."98 Unlike the objectivist, who sees interpretation as a constraint
on legal power, the subjectivist views interpretation as the cause of unre-
strained, coercive power.99 The subjectivist understands all acts of interpre-
tation as rank assertions of political power. i° Therefore, a subjective
interpretivist can find "no 'real' basis for moral criticism of law any more
than.., a 'real' basis for adjudication. '"'0 ' Ultimately, the subjectivist must
conclude that his own critique of the law is an exercise in vanity because he
cannot credibly propose a set of values that "ought" to supplant the ones
already in place.'02 Thus, from the subjectivists' view, the politically em-
powered determine the values reflected in the law, and the law, in turn, is
equal" theory); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (confirming the position of the
African American slave as mere property by holding that the Missouri Compromise deprived
slave owners of their property without due process).
94. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (sometimes referred to as the
Indians' Dred Scott decision, sustaining an allotment act against the claim that the allotment
process violated a solemn treaty and due process of law); see generally C. WILKINSON, AMERI-
CAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW (1987).
95. The handicapped have faced segregation and degradation throughout history. Institu-
tions have been erected to warehouse the retarded for life, A. MOORE, THE FEEBLE-MINDED
IN NEW YORK 11 (1911); retarded children were denied education, see, e.g., Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 294-95 (E.D. Pa. 1972); and
state statutes have denied mentally handicapped persons citizenship, Act of Apr. 3, 1920, ch.
210, § 17, 1920 Miss. LAWS 288, 294. States have also enacted compulsory eugenic steriliza-
tion laws. J. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION 302-03 (1932); see also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (upholding a zoning ordinance that excluded
group homes for the mentally retarded from the community); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, (1978) (majority opinion of Powell, J.); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
(upholding a state statute that permitted sterilization of state supported mentally handicapped
persons who have an inheritable form of insanity or imbecility). Justice Holmes' regrettable
but infamous decision stated, "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
96. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down Congress' at-
tempt to regulate child labor via the interstate commerce clause). Effective federal regulation
of child labor came only in 1938 with the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1982).
97. West, supra note 78, at 206-07.
98. Id. at 244.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 247.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 253.
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critiqued on its success or failure in reflecting those values. The subjectivists
contend that criticism based on values derived from alternate visions are
politically enfeebled, while criticisms based on a vision of true human nature
are absurd inasmuch as the subjectivist denies any ultimate, immutable
truth. 1
0 3
In reality, adjudication extends beyond mere interpretation because the
law carries legal sanction." A judge wields power with the force of the
state behind it.' Therefore, a judge's interpretation becomes an impera-
tive. Literary critics, however, wield no such authoritative power. Literary
criticism is pure interpretation without an imperative. In this sense, judicial
action is profoundly different from literary criticism. 106
The consequences of the imperative element of the law help explain why
judges are less likely to give legal text a freeinterpretation that is not firmly
based in prior history or legislative intent, instead adhering generally to the
principle of stare decisis. The consequences of textual interpretation in the
legal context also explain the vigor with which contending sides in the inter-
pretivist/non-interpretivist debate defend their positions with regard to con-
stitutional hermeneutics.'1 7 In short, lawyers and judges seek to support
103. Id. at 252.
104. Id. at 277; see also R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 240-43.
105. West, supra note 78, at 257.
106. Id.; see generally R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 211-68.
107. "Interpretivists" (also known as "intentionalists") hold the view that judges are bound
to what is clearly implicit in the words of the Constitution. "Non-interpretivists" (referred to
alternately as "non-intentionalists" or the "value-oriented" school of constitutional interpreta-
tion) hold the view that judges should incorporate societal consensus on changing fundamental
values in their interpretation of the Constitution. For examples of affirmations of the non-
interpretivist view, see M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICI-
ARY (1982); Grey, "Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?," 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975);
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary
Thought, 39 STAN. L. REV. 343 (1978). For examples of the interpretivist position, see R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradi-
tion, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property" 62 CORNELL L.J. 405
(1977). Judge Robert Bork is described alternately as an interpretivist (intentionalist), Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971), or an
"originalist," reflecting his unwillingness to depart from the original underlying premises of
the framers, but his willingness to depart from the framers' specific intentions. The underlying
premises represent a core value which Bork believes judges are obliged to protect while apply-
ing in circumstances which the framers could not have foreseen. In formulating the underly-
ing premises, Bork would not advocate any level of generality which was higher than that
which could be fairly supported by the words, structure, and history of the Constitution, be-
cause such a generalization creates an unrestricted source of judicial power. Bork, Original
Intent: The Only Legitimate Basis for Constitutional Decision Making, 26 JUDGES J. 12, 13-16
(Summer 1987); Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 823 (1986); R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
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their interpretations of law with authoritative precedent and legislative (or
authors') intent because law operates as a command. i' Literary critics need
not be constrained either by an author's intent or authoritative precedent,
because the literary critic commands no legally sanctioned authority, and
the literary critic's work is compelling only to the extent that his or her peers
respect the degree of scholarship reflected. Continuity with past interpreta-
tions bears little relation to the literary critic's influence, yet a novel literary
angle can create an instant flurry of interest in the literary sphere. Legal
interpretation, however, impacts the lives of the community in either an op-
pressive or liberating way, causing some legal scholars to declare themselves
intentionalists I°9 when reading law, and subjective interpretivists when read-
ing literature. 10'
Thus, important distinctions delimit the uses of literary critical techniques
in legal interpretation, and help to formulate the special hermeneutic charac-
ter of law. The student of law should not infer, however, that the tools of
literary criticism do not greatly serve the legal profession. The insights
drawn from applying literary theory to legal analysis can raise significant
questions for legal scholars and students. The questions themselves will sug-
gest the direction needed to be taken to achieve just legal solutions.
C. Law as the Art of Rhetoric
On a separate plane apart from the interpretation controversy, literature
has applications to the advocacy dimension of legal practice. Some lawyers
have sifted literature for its lessons on rhetoric and found those lessons to be
a professional asset."' There is a nobility in legal advocacy. Legal advo-
cacy need not conjure an image of the Sophists, but rather of Cicero. Preci-
sion and eloqu~nce in language can help to shed the "masks" of inaccessible
and stilted legal terminology. Lawyers should be percipient to rhetorical
devices in order to hone their skills in the art of presentation, as well as to
defend against corrupt practitioners. Clever and powerful deflective tech-
niques in language can veil sophistic arguments. Legal issues can become
confused within emotional appeals and elusive language. Critical probing of
THE LAW (1989). John Hart Ely's position is sometimes characterized as falling between the
interpretivist/non-interpretivist extremes, and has been referred to as a "process-oriented" ap-
proach to judicial review. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW, 88-89 (1980); Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 5 (1978). For a commentary on Ely's theory, see Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of the
Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
108. West, supra note 78, at 277.
109. Supra note 107.
110. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 218.
111. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 269-316; cf. White, supra note 7, at 2037-38.
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judicial opinions, legal arguments, and political debates may be easily handi-
capped if the lawyer lacks the language sophistication needed to penetrate
deceptive language devices. Yet most law schools devote little time to devel-
oping the skills of written and oral legal advocacy.
To become a master of words and the structure and uses of language is the
lawyer's professional responsibility, as it is the author's passion. Literature
could provide the law professor with many memorable illustrations of clear
and persuasive language and could be an enormously effective teaching tool
for developing written and oral legal advocacy skills.
III. A JURY OF HER PEERS
A. A Literary Interpretation of the Story
A Jury of Her Peers,112 a short story written by Susan Glaspell in 1917,
presents a feminine perspective on the law replete with metaphor. Glaspell's
story presents a conspicuous opportunity to examine the lessons in law that
a feminist writer urged in 1917 and to explore which lessons were well taken.
A Jury of Her Peers opens in the womanly setting of the kitchen of Martha
Hale,1 13 the story's protagonist, on a cold March day. In the opening para-
graph, the reader can detect a hint of the gathering feminine rebellion
against the established order, symbolized by the "cut of the north wind, '114
even if Martha herself is not fully cognizant of her own unarticulated long-
ings. The reader can also sense an imminent rebirth-spring approaching.
In the story, Martha finds herself hurriedly called away from her kitchen
duties to attend to an urgent situation that "was probably farther from ordi-
nary than anything that had ever happened in Dickson County." '115 The
masculine sounding "Dickson County" is a metaphor for the pervading mas-
culine legal culture. Martha's abrupt departure from her "ordinary" rou-
tine, leaving the bread she was making unfinished, with "half the flour sifted
and half unsifted,"" ' 6 signals the subtle, but drastic break with the past and
the radical transformation of the women of Dickson County that is about to
112. Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, EVERY WEEK (1917), reprinted in THE BEST SHORT
STORIES OF 1917, at 256 (E. O'Brien ed. 1918).
113. The name has a Biblical reference. Martha is the Biblical figure who slavishly at-
tended to the household duties in obedience to social norms, while neglecting the full develop-
ment of her humanity. Luke 10:40-42 (The Jerusalem Bible). The reader will recognize the
relevance, not necessarily biblical, of the names of each of the story's characters. In addition,
the reader should be sensitive to the significance of the form of address used in the story, as
when the author describes Mr. Hale alternately as Lewis and Mrs. Hale's husband. Glaspell,
supra note 112, at 259.
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occur. The "half sifted," "half unsifted" flour is a metaphor for both the
arrested self-development of the women under the established law and cul-
ture, and the deficient nature of the established law and culture itself. In
either case, it is bread "all ready for mixing," ' 1 7 waiting to be baked-or
made whole and wholesome.
A few paragraphs later, Martha joins her husband along with Sheriff Pe-
ters, his wife, and Mr. Henderson, the county attorney, in a "big two-seated
buggy."'l 8 The buggy provides a metaphor for a society which has two es-
sential components, male and female. Law and custom relegate the female
component to the "back seat.""' 9 They are traveling to the scene of the
extraordinary event. 20
The author generously shades the story with the emerging feminine per-
spective. The story notes that Mrs. Peters, the sheriff's wife, was "small and
thin and didn't have a strong voice."'' Because she is conspicuously bereft
of personality and the descriptions of her are oddly conceptual, the reader
could understand Mrs. Peters to personify the status of women under the
law. Her small stature represents her stunted development as a fully respon-
sible, self-realized, female adult. Her thinness represents how the legal sys-
tem ignores, neglects, and fails to nurture her. The fact that her voice lacks
vitality means that she lacks the political power to impact the legal system to
which she is subject.
The story also states that Mrs. Peters, in fact, does not "look like a sher-
iff's wife,"' 22 and is actually quite unlike the previous sheriff's wife, who
was more robust. Mrs. Peters' faltering manner and her relation to the sher-
iff is a metaphor for the nascent self-awareness of the women of Dickson
County and their relation to the law. The former sheriff's wife, and by anal-
ogy, her female contemporaries, "had a voice that somehow seemed to be
backing up the law with every word."' 23 The seeming strength of the wo-
men of the past derived from the fact that they assumed their prescribed
position within the dominant legal structure, and in doing so, their voices
were swallowed by the thunder of the law.' 24 By contrast, the murmurous
voices of the new women of Dickson County are weak next to the voice of








124. Id. at 265-66. Note that the county attorney remarks, "[o]f course [the sheriff's wife]
is one of us." Id.
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their female predecessors in the sense that they have begun to reject the
political and social dominance of men, in a radical departure from the past.
Their voices do not merge with the powerful legal baritones, but hum a dar-
ing counterpoint.
The story, which was written before women's suffrage,' 25 reflects male
institutions, such as the law, privileged with a distinctly masculine world
vision, lacking channels for truly feminine participation and undermining
the assertiveness of women. Many people contend that female exclusion
continues to pervade society.1 26 A Jury of Her Peers was, in 1917, and to
some extent remains, a mirror of the marginalized group experience of
women.
The sheriff, Mr. Peters, personifies the dominant legal culture as a "heavy
man with a big voice."' 2 7 Mr. Peters' stature suggests that he is well-nur-
tured, endorsed, and a thriving member of society. The fact that he speaks
with a big voice represents his political empowerment, no doubt responsible
for his vitality. He was "particularly genial with the law-abiding, as if to
make it plain that he knew the difference between criminals and non-
criminals."' 128 Mr. Peters, or the dominant legal culture that he represents,
equates the law-abiding with the non-criminal and the non-law-abiding with
the criminal.
The story carefully exacts the notion that a fully self-realized woman was
an outsider to the legal system and masculine culture. Against the back-
ground of the era and the denial of the franchise to women, a woman's sub-
mission to the law was manifestly unfair. However, the protagonist of the
story recognizes that if she does not submit to the law, she might be consid-
ered non-law-abiding, somehow criminal, with the "heavy" sanction of the
law perched precariously above her. Mrs. Hale subconsciously experiences
the appalling inequity of her legal status, which comes into her mind "with a
stab,"' 2 9 the painful realization that the law is perniciously intrusive and
debilitating to women. The reader, empathizing with Mrs. Hale, temporar-
ily assumes her feminine perspective. As a result, the story interacts with
the reader in a profoundly unique way, compelling the reader's subordina-
tion of any personal parochial perspective or bias and promoting the reader's
exploration of the perspective of the protagonist, in this case, Mrs. Hale.
In light of the women's acute sense of their vulnerability as political out-
siders, and notwithstanding the realization that "they ought to be talking as
125. U.S. CONST. amend XIX (granting suffrage to women).
126. See, e.g., supra notes 34 and 37.
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well as the men,"' 130 or demanding to be heard in the political process, the
women in the story remain reluctant to assert their feminine voice. The
equation of the non-law-abiding with the criminal places Mrs. Hale, as an
emerging self-realized woman, in an intuitively empathetic posture toward
the criminal, or fellow outsider. Her sense of shared vulnerability makes
Mrs. Hale uneasy at the sight of the scene of the crime, the Wright place.
Upon approaching the Wright place, she does not "feel like talking,' 31 or
challenging the official interpretation of justice. On the other hand, the
county attorney, talking and leaning "to one side of the buggy" '32 under the
symbolic imbalance of his one-sided perspective, is anxious to discover the
evidence that would convict Minnie Foster, Mr. Wright's wife and the sus-
pect in his murder. The male voice is ever regnant in the story; the female
voice, ever discouraged in its longing to emerge.
The crime appears to have everything to do with an assertion of the femi-
nine voice. When Martha Hale arrived at the door of the Wright's house,
she "had a moment of feeling she could not cross that threshold ... simply
because she hadn't crossed it before."' 33 For Martha, crossing the threshold
into Minnie Foster's house was a symbolic, irretrievable act of solidarity
with Minnie, who had broken with the established order, albeit through a
contemptible act of murder, leaving Minnie exposed to the hostility of the
powerful.' 34 Martha projects how abysmally vulnerable she too could be-
come with regard to societal pressure and even legal sanction if she stands in
opposition to the established norm of masculine dominance.
The story illustrates how the law, lacking a mandate from the women of
the community, coercively constrains them. Every act of law is an act of
force against the women. Exclusion and vulnerability compel the women to
unite in the hopes of emerging as politically empowered persons, and the





134. The reader detects the hostility of the county attorney when he beckons the women,
after crossing the threshold of Minnie Foster's door, to " '[c]ome up to the fire, ladies,' " sym-
bolically meaning step into the fire. Id. at 258. Women, speaking in unison in the person of
Mrs. Peters, however, are able to assert with trepidation, " 'I'm not - cold,' " at last refusing
to repress their uniquely feminine voice. Id.
135. Examples of the women clinging to each other can be found throughout the story.
See, e.g., "'I'm glad you came with me,' Mrs. Peters said nervously, as the two women were
about to follow the men in through the kitchen door." Id. at 257. "'You coming with me,
Mrs. Hale?' she asked nervously." Id. at 267. "'But I'm awful glad you came with me, Mrs.
Hale .... It would be lonesome for me - sitting here alone.'" Id. at 274. "'I guess before
we're through with her she may have something more serious than preserves to worry about.'
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genders the belief that only by the women's combined voices can they have
an impact on the established legal structure, and only then to the extent
necessary to restore the quiet.' 36
Martha, with a sense of the possibility of a uniquely feminine political
identity, is acutely aware of how precious and tenuous that identity would
be. The reader is left to.imagine the lengths to which Martha would go in
order to preserve that identity, propelled by the emerging realization of the
history of female subjugation to men. Exclusion and subjugation of women
has resulted either in alienation, which leads to dislocation within the legal
system, or in accommodation to the male ethos, which leads to adoption of
the male autonomy ideal in an effort to gain empowerment. At several
points in the story, the women are tempted to embrace the autonomy ideal
and to return the "fire" of their oppressors with "fire." The author uses fire
symbolically as the weapon of the politically powerful to eliminate any in-
cursions on their status as dominators. 137 In the story, for instance, Mrs.
Hale, turning from the stove, says pointedly that the "fire [is] not.., much
to brag of," and then more aggressively, "[t]he law is the law - and a bad
stove is a bad stove. How'd you like to cook on this?"' 13' Later, when look-
ing at the sheriff, "[h]er eyes felt like fire." 139 Ultimately, the extreme posi-
tion subconsciously entertained by Martha is self-defeating because it denies
the truly interdependent nature of human beings. The author makes the
point that no one class can afford to tailor the system narrowly to its singular
perspective in a bid for dominance. The answer to patriarchy is not matriar-
chy, the story suggests, but the full participation of every member of society
as a dignified and vital component.
[said the county attorney, speaking of Mrs. Wright, the suspect] ... The two women moved a
little closer together. Neither of them spoke." Id. at 264. At Mrs. Hale's home, "the sheriff
came running in to say his wife wished Mrs. Hale would come too - adding, with a grin, that
he guessed she was getting scarey and wanted another woman along." Id. at 256.
136. Women, African Americans, the poor, and the handicapped have asserted themselves
with varying degrees of success in this manner. The Women's Suffrage Movement culminated
with the passage of the nineteenth amendment, and the 1960's Civil Rights movement influ-
enced major civil rights legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1975, 2000a-2000h (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Other attempts at inclusion in the political system,
such as Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, have had a more modest impact.
137. See, e.g., supra note 134.
138. Glaspell, supra note 112, at 270. Mrs. Peters also comes close to succumbing to that
very mentality when she remembers:
'When I was a girl ... my kitten - there was a boy took a hatchet, and before my
eyes - before I could get there -' She covered her face an instant. 'If they hadn't
held me back I would have' - she caught herself, looked upstairs where footsteps
were heard, and finished weakly - 'hurt him.'
Id. at 277.
139. Id. at 280.
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The story establishes that Mrs. Wright, Minnie Foster, apparently mur-
dered her husband, who embodied the oppressive male system and abused
her. But the story alludes to the notion that Mr. Wright planted the seeds of
his own destruction. "'He died of a rope round his neck,' "14 Minnie Fos-
ter says, but she is unable to recall how the rope had been placed around her
husband's neck.' 41 Superficially, Minnie's memory lapse is explicable as the
murderer's psychological denial reflex. But metaphorically, the rope was al-
ready in place. The story suggests that a system based on domination is
ultimately not viable and causes its own inevitable demise. Mr. Wright, the
embodiment of the dominant legal system, was at every moment more vul-
nerable than he could have imagined for all the bravado of masculine
superiority.
Minnie Foster, too, fatally erred when she ultimately attempted to replace
the oppression of her husband, and by analogy, of the dominant legal sys-
tem, with her own debarring act of power. The consequence was spontane-
ous mutual annihilation. Minnie predicted her own self-defeat when she
worried that " 'when it turned so cold [the night of the murder] ... the fire
would go out and her jars might burst.' "142 The cold is reminiscent of the
north wind of the new feminism. The fire represents the bi-level oppression
of the masculine legal system and her husband, whom Minnie imagines she
will annihilate, or cause to "go out."
Minnie, symbolized by her jars, intuits her own self-annihilation, or
"bursting" as the ultimate consequence of her act. Minnie's final desperate
act did not, after all, free her from oppression, but infected her with the same
terminal perspective which positioned the rope around her husband's neck.
In the story, Minnie's pet bird, which is closely identified with herself,'43 is
found dead with a broken neck, 44 paralleling her husband's fate. In re-
counting how Minnie acted on the day Mr. Wright's body was discovered,
Mr. Hale says, "'Well, I was surprised. She didn't ask me to come up to the
stove, or to sit down, but just set there, not even lookin' at me.' ,,44- The
"fire" of oppression, this time Minnie Foster's flame, was extinguished.
Minnie Foster was as lifeless as her husband, metaphorically murdered by
her husband in the act of killing her bird, and existentially self-excommuni-
140. Id. at 261.
141. Id. at 262.
142. Id. at 264.
143. The reader learns that Minnie used to sing before she became married. After her
marriage, the songs of the bird recalled to her the memory of a happier time. Id. at 268, 273,
275, 277.
144. Id. at 276.
145. Id. at 261.
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cated from human fellowship by succeeding her husband as dominator and
annihilator.
The story indicates that the frustration of living under an oppressive legal
system can provoke the oppressed to react in uncharacteristically violent
ways. Years of oppression had perverted Minnie's true nature and weltered
her gifts. In the atmosphere of the new feminism, which, as Minnie exempli-
fies, is capable of manifesting as gross a hostility toward men, Mrs. Hale
becomes alarmed for the welfare of her son, fearing "that maybe [he] wasn't
dressed warm enough - they hadn't any of them realized how that north
wind did bite."' 4 6 Mr. Hale, too, catches the forewarning import of the
event. Testifying about his discovery of Mr. Wright's body, he recounts,
" 'Well, my first thought was to get that rope off.' ... He stopped, his face
twitching, '  presumably with self-association.
Throughout the story, the author conveys the potential for bitter conflict
between segments of society, such as men and women, who exist in relative
political and social profound inequality within a legal system structured to
deflect, rather than incorporate, collateral or minority viewpoints. The con-
flict is perceived, at first by the men, later by Minnie Foster, to involve "all
or nothing" stakes with a "winner take all" meed. The dead man is the
outward manifestation of the men's innermost horror 1 4 8-the image of their
own possible annihilation. Just as Minnie reacted fiercely to the "de-femi-
nizing" effect of persistent male domination, so lies the potential for men to
obliterate irrationally the encroachment of alternate perspectives. The story
portrays an ominous sense of male defensiveness in the following passage:
The men talked for a minute about what a good thing it was the
sheriff had sent his deputy out that morning to make a fire for
them, and then Sheriff Peters stepped back from the stove, unbut-
toned his outer coat, and leaned his hands on the kitchen table in a
way that seemed to mark the beginning of official business. 'Now,
Mr. Hale,' he said in a sort of semi-official voice, 'before we move
things about, you tell Mr. Henderson just what it was you saw
when you came here yesterday morning."4 9
146. Id. at 259.
147. Id. at 262. Note also the county attorney's comment that "'[s]omebody should have
been left here yesterday [the day of the murder],' [to which the sheriff replied,] 'Oh - yester-
day,' . . . with a little gesture as of yesterday having been more than he could bear to think of."
Id. at 258.
148. The Wright's house is the archetypal setting for the male/female struggle. It is a
struggle which takes place in the mind and the house is symbolically set "down in a hollow"
where "you don't see the road." Id. at 274.
149. Id. at 258. For further symbols of male suppression of the emerging feminism, notice
how often the heavy footsteps of the men are heard above the women as the men investigate
the upstairs of the Wright house. The footstops are reminders to the women of the men's
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The talking among the men indicates their political empowerment. The
sheriff, relieved that his deputy prepared a fire, is as confident as a soldier
with a fresh supply of ammunition. The sheriff assumes a threatening pos-
ture toward the women when he steps back from the stove, unbuttons his
coat, and leans on the kitchen table, which is symbolic of the feminine realm.
His official or adversarial attitude toward the women can be distinguished
from his semi-official, or more friendly tone toward Mr. Hale. Ultimately,
the sheriff is intent on moving things about or reestablishing the male domi-
nance, which was upset by Minnie's defiant act.
A Jury of Her Peers further explores the implications of the gender experi-
ence on perception. The story suggests that the county attorney's inquiry
into the facts surrounding Mr. Wright's death had a masculine bias, and that
his masculine perspective hindered his ability to recognize evidence, not only
of Minnie Foster's guilt, but of her emotional desperation as well.' 5 ° The
county attorney is not responsive to the signs of Minnie's desperation be-
cause, as a man, he has not experienced the derogation of political
powerlessness, and his investigation reflects his limited experience. It is ulti-
mately the women who, although they have not been invited to partake in
the investigation, with little effort piece together the puzzle of incriminating
evidence against Minnie, while the men are frustrated in their efforts.' 5 '
Ironically, Mr. Hale, after "rubb[ing] his face after the fashion of a show
man getting ready for a pleasantry [says] 'But would the women know a clue
if they did come upon it?' ,152
The women, upon discovering a bird cage with a wrenched door, and
Minnie's pet bird dead,' 53 at once understand that the bird convicts Mr.
Wright as much as it convicts Mrs. Wright. The women surmise that Mr.
Wright killed his wife's pet in an act of extreme aggression against his wife.
The cumulative effect of his lifelong abuse, culminating in the shocking kill-
ing of the bird, motivated Minnie Foster to kill her husband. The women
fear, however, that the legal system would not be receptive to the signifi-
capacity to "trample" them and can be heard at critical points of the women's dialogue, just
when they seem on the verge of fully asserting their feminine voice. See, e.g., id. at 277, dis-
cussed supra note 138; see also id. at 269, 270-71, 279.
150. See, e.g., id. at 260. Mr. Hale, speaking to the attorney, says, "'I didn't know as what
his wife wanted made much difference to John.' " The county attorney interrupts with, " 'I do
want to talk about that, but I'm anxious now to get along to just what happened when you got
here.' " Id. at 260. Addressing the sheriff, Mrs. Hale says, " 'But I don't think a place would
be any the cheerfuler for John Wright's bein' in it.' " The sheriff responded, " 'I'd like to talk
to you about that a little later, Mrs. Hale... I'm anxious to get the lay of things upstairs
[where the body was found] now.'" Id. at 265.
151. Id. at 275-76.
152. Id. at 266.
153. Id. at 275-76.
[Vol. 39:557
Lessons In Law From Literature
cance of their feminine insight. Thus, the women conceal the evidence.154
By doing so, the women admittedly impeded conventional justice. 55 The
women understand that without the evidence, Minnie Foster would likely go
free, but they also surmise that with the evidence, Mr. Wright would not be
exposed for emotionally destroying his wife. Only a jury of her peers could
have understood the total import of the evidence, and inasmuch as the truly
feminine insight was not officially relevant, true justice, which would have
convicted both parties, was thwarted. A court of law could not have been
any more just than the women of Dickson County.
B. A Legal Application of the Story
1. The Need to Make the Legal System More Inclusive
A Jury of Her Peers is a reflection on the idea that institutions established
by men and predominantly for men, such as the law, are deficient and even
brutish without the feminine perspective. This story was a daring socio-
political statement at the time it was written, before women enjoyed a polit-
ical voice. Three years later, the nineteenth amendment was passed, grant-
ing women nationwide the right to vote and thus allowing the feminine
perspective to impact more significantly the law. A Jury of Her Peers pro-
vided a non-violent and articulate register of women's cry for inclusion and
could have penetrated the walls of law schools, complementing a technical
course on criminal procedure, and inviting prospective legal representatives
to explore rationally the rights of women at a time when women, themselves,
were not likely to be found in law school.' 5 6
At the same time, A Jury of Her Peers indicted the entire legal system,
which, operating in a social context of white male predominance, tended to
exclude other minority segments as well as women, and to foster competition
rather than cooperation in the struggle for political empowerment. The
story, therefore, could have provided a stimulating, if controversial, spring-
board for the critique of liberal legalism"-' among law students of that time,
154. Id. at 281.
155. Id. at 278 (" 'It was an awful thing was done in this house that night, Mrs. Hale,' said
the sheriff's wife. 'Killing a man while he slept - slipping a thing round his neck that choked
the life out of him.'.... 'The law has got to punish crime, Mrs. Hale ... ').
156. "Women were barred from attending law school at Harvard until 1950 and at Wash-
ington and Lee until as late as 1972." Goldberg, Then and Now. 75 Years of Change, 76
A.B.A. J., Jan., 1990, at 56. It was not until 1972 that all accredited law schools accepted
women. Fossum, Law and the Sexual Integration of Institutions: The Case of American Law
Schools, 7 ALSA FORUM 22 (1983). The first woman to graduate from law school was Char-
lotte Ray, who graduated from Howard Law School in 1873. D. RHODE, JUSTICE AND OR-
DER 23 (1989).
157. See West, supra note 34.
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and could do so today. The deconstructionist technique could be applied, in
the interest of open dialogue, to various areas of law to locate where the
privileged perspective may be overbearing. The law student, not bound by
the author's intent, could develop underlying elements of literary works,
such as A Jury of Her Peers, of which the author was unaware, generating
new insight for the law in the 1990's. Only the most superficial reading of
Ms. Glaspell's story could fail to enlighten students beyond the mere recog-
nition that the story recounted a physical murder.' 58
2. The Terms of Inclusion
As the rape example above also illustrates, A Jury of Her Peers suggests
that the gender experience has pervasive implications in the legal system. In
this way, the story not only raises the question of female or minority inclu-
sion, but it also hints at the possible terms of that inclusion.
159
In the story, subtle gender-based distinctions, correlative to the gender
experience, affect what evidence is deemed legally relevant, and what consti-
tutes criminality. The privileging of the dominant masculine perspective so
infected the investigative process, as to reject the feminine perspective, even
when an attempt to interject it is made by a man."6 The question for the
reader shifts from whether inclusion can be secured at all, to whether the
traditional norms of male institutions can accommodate the feminine per-
spective, even if inclusion was unanimously desired.
Empathy must crystallize into meaningful efforts to incorporate the
nondominant or undervalued perspective. Otherwise, participation by the
158. Cf R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 112-13.
159. Cf Gewirtz, Aeschylus' Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1043 (1988). Professor Gewirtz
notes that the current debate over the political inclusion of women has shifted from whether
women should be included at all - to what that inclusion entails, and interprets Aeschylus'
trilogy of plays, the Oresteia, as raising the possibility that inclusion involves the transforma-
tion of traditional legal norms. Id. at 1054-55. Professor Gewirtz asserts:
In the play's scheme, the alternative to inclusion is the Furies marginalized -
remaining a roving band of vengeful females harassing the city and perpetuating
blood feuds, or becoming permanent exiles. There is no doubt that Aeschylus por-
trays the solution of inclusion as far better. The play's forces are harmonized and
resolved only when the female comes to be included - only when the male perspec-
tive and female perspective each secures a place of high honor, each contributing to
the social order.
For all the ritualized harmony, though, the question remains whether this is a
myth of gender reconciliation or really one of female subordination . . . [C]oercion
shapes the Furies' inclusion. The terms of inclusion are crafted by Athena, who has
just ruled against the Furies.
Id. at 1052-53 (footnote omitted).
160. See supra note 150 (where Mr. Hale's reference to Mr. Wright's indifference to his
wife's needs is ignored by the county attorney). See generally supra note 37.
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underclass threatens to be mere co-option, sandbagging the momentum of
social change with a misguided sense of inclusion. Thus, the legal dilemmas
in accommodating difference among values and perspectives are squarely
presented in the story. Engaging multiple perspectives, at the expense of
ready solutions, if necessary, is critical for the lawyer. The law student
could begin by reading literature, such as A Jury of Her Peers, which
presents a challenge to traditional legal norms.
Today, women are no longer politically suppressed to the degree exper-
ienced by the author of A Jury of Her Peers. A woman sits on the bench of
the highest court in the land, the United States Supreme Court, 16 1 and wo-
men comprise approximately forty percent of law school enrollment. 162 As
women begin to occupy meaningful and influential positions in the legal sys-
tem, the answer to the question posed by the story's county attorney remains
relevant. "The county attorney was looking around the kitchen. 'By the
way,' he said, 'has anything been moved?' He turned to the sheriff. 'Are
things just as you left them yesterday?' "9163
IV. LITERATURE: THE MISSING DIMENSION IN LEGAL EDUCATION
A Jury of Her Peers is neither conventional material for students in law
school, nor is it in any way authoritative. Nevertheless, the issues that the
story raises could enrich the student's development as a legal thinker, adding
missing dimensions to the law school syllabus.
A legal thinker need only reject the most extreme objectivist/subjectivist
postures developed above to affirm the value of literature for law and legal
education. The application of legal and literary ideas to the present story
shows that literature is valuable to law and legal education. Literature de-
velops the lawyer's empathetic capacity by revealing the experiences and the
perspectives of other people, thereby exposing parochial views and the insti-
tutions shaped in accordance with such views. In A Jury of Her Peers, the
reader assumes the perspective of someone who is not equal under the law.
In this way, the reader is likely to acquire the insight necessary to under-
stand more intimately the particular experience of women under the legal
system, as well as general claims of unequal representation. The reader is
also asked to reconsider what makes a given act criminal and to treat as
suspect legal practices and customs that disadvantage women, and by exten-
161. In 1981, Sandra Day O'Connor became the first woman to serve as an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
162. Jost, Book Review, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 105 (reviewing JACK, MORAL VISION AND
PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS
(1989)).
163. Glaspell, supra note 112, at 258.
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sion, minorities. The lawyer, having read and assimilated this story, is there-
fore more likely to bring this insight into public policy discussions that could
ultimately redound to lawmaking bodies. Thus, literature could inspire legal
practicioners to pursue multiple perspectives and to challenge the self-per-
petuating power framework when necessary to the pursuit of justice.
Literature could also help the lawyer understand the relation of several
true accounts of the same event, colored by values and perspectives that are
in conflict. Literature could broaden the scope of the legally relevant fact.
For example, the county attorney's account of Mr. Wright's death differed
substantially from Martha Hale's understanding, and neither rendition was
integral in itself. Thus, literature could equip lawyers and judges to discern
and incorporate the truth of events as they are experienced from diverse
perspectives.
Literature could introduce the lawyer to moral alternatives which could
then be integrated into authoritative discourse and institutional perspectives.
It could provide the lawyer with the unofficial supplement to authoritative
text. In A Jury of Her Peers, the reader confronts the moral alternatives
posed by the masculine and feminine perspectives in the context of the vivid
experience of the characters. Thus, literature could encourage moral dis-
course and legal responsiveness to enduring human values.
The legal advocate who is adept in the rhetorical arts could utilize the
many illuminating analogues supplied by literature to assist a jury in com-
prehending the parties involved in the conflict. The tragedy of Minnie Fos-
ter could help explain the tragedy of a battered woman. In addition,
literature could teach the legal advocate to avoid elusive language. Thus,
literature could uniquely contribute to the law student's development of
legal writing skills and oral advocacy, and could sensitize the lawyer to the
relationship of language to truth and morality.
Both reading literature and reading law as literature can arm the lawyer
with the knowledge and perception that justice demands. But this is only
possible if the reader is emancipated from a unitary focus on positive, au-
thoritative text and customary modes of perception. If the goal of the legal
system is truly to reflect the enduring human values which proceed from all
sectors of society, so as eventually to transform society from its present state
to what it ought to be, the criticism of law must be predicated, not solely on
what is, but also on what ought to be." 6 Legal criticism should not be tied
164. West, supra note 78, at 278. The concept of law as encapsulating a common moral
basis which will facilitate the transition from what society is, to what it ought to be, reflects the
general form of a moral scheme which, if only by implication, recognizes a teleological view of
human nature and society. Modern philosophy, some claim, has tended to deprive humanity
of its telos, making ambiguous the role of moral discourse. See, A. MACINTYRE, supra note
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to authoritative legal text, but should be able to repudiate authoritative text
when it fails to reflect living human ideals. Deconstruction and other inter-
pretive devices used in literature can illuminate the lawyer's understanding
of how the law interacts with society by unearthing hidden motivations or
ramifications of official legal action. These insights inform the lawyer's
moral and political decision-making, giving law the face of humanity.
If the use of literature in legal education precipitates the challenge to and
disruption of some of the dominant legal practices and conceptual struc-
tures, such change will occur because lawyers have taken lessons from litera-
ture about how the law should operate in a rich, concrete, cultural context,
and not in the realm of the abstract. The challenges will be posed because
lawyers will have learned from literature to discern where legal theory does
not comport with human experience and legal institutions have become in-
tractable and tendentious. The challenges will be made by lawyers who have
developed, from literature, an appreciation for eloquence in presentation and
a sharpened awareness of the potentials of language usage. Lawyers who
take lessons on law from literature will challenge the law to reflect the evolv-
ing moral vision of the community of men and women working together in
political friendship.
V. CONCLUSION
The interplay of law and literature has entered modern legal discussion,
gaining increasing influence over the past decade, and coming to be widely
recognized as the law and literature movement. Some legal reformists have
enthusiastically embraced the movement for the tools that it lends to the
critique, and even dismantling, of law and legal institutions. More cautious
legal thinkers have warned against an overextended application of literature
and literary interpretive devices to law and legal institutions. A reasonable
balance can be achieved whereby literature can be incorporated into the
24, at 51-61. The legal counterpart to the rejection of teleology is displayed in legal positivism,
which conceives a legal system liberated from ethical, metaphysical, or theological founda-
tions. See D. GRANFIELD, supra note 17, at 26-29. Without a teleological context, however,
societal reform lacks clear direction. Amidst increasing controversy over social issues, Legal
Realism, and its most contemporary strain, Critical Legal Studies, exhibit attempts to renew
emphasis on fundamental values in the law. Id. at 33-35. Although there is no consensus on
the formulation of those values, there is gradually emerging a loose body of jurisprudential
thought which has begun to recognize aspects of fundamental human nature. Among the
contributors are Harold Lasswell and Myres MacDougal (jurisprudence based on human dig-
nity), Robert Nozick (libertarian state based on limited natural rights) and Ronald Dworkin
(naturalistic approach to individual human rights). Id. at 35. Literature could provide an
acceptable mode for putting the law to this philosophical question, and could help to reopen
dialogue aimed at the shared recognition of ultimate societal ends.
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study of law, making a unique and invaluable contribution to legal educa-
tion, while deferring to the special attributes and purposes of legal text.
Judging from the mounting quantity of recent scholarly commentary that
recognizes a rich rapport between law and literature, it is time to take a look
at the movement.
Three modes of using literature in legal study can be roughly categorized.
First, literature provides a vehicle for articulating, and a source for discern-
ing, a public commitment to a shared moral value system. As such, litera-
ture has particular relevance to law because ideally, the law is a codification
of those values, but is not, in itself, the source for those values. Literature
facilitates moral discourse, and in the legal context, would provide a means
to evaluate existing law and practices against the evolving public moral vi-
sion. In addition, literature has often given voice to the underrepresented
members of society by offering the reader a direct experiential encounter
with the daily realities of marginalized people. Thus, literature, as exempli-
fied by A Jury of Her Peers, could facilitate the inclusion of minority or
undervalued perspectives in the legal process.
Second, literary method possesses highly developed and relevant tech-
niques for textual interpretation, and some legal thinkers have experimented
with its cross-application to legal text. For reasons stemming from the dis-
tinct functions of law and literature, this interdisciplinary approach has been
a strongly controverted area of the law and literature movement. Contro-
versy notwithstanding, the interdisciplinary application of literary interpre-
tive techniques has initiated insightful and revelatory inquiries into law and
legal structures.
Third, literature can tutor lawyers on the eloquence of language, fostering
excellence in rhetoric. The role of lawyers and literary authors converge as
society's communicators, and the common need for highly developed skill
with the tools of language creates the possibility of a mutually enlightening
relationship between the two fields.
Thus, broadly speaking, the law and literature movement has a triangular
dimension. Literature offers law its substance, its interpretive devices, and
its rhetorical excellence. Each point of congruence between law and litera-
ture provides a source of limitless possibilities and alone would justify the
reference to literature in legal education.
Literature reflects knowledge about true human nature; law governs socie-
tal activity based upon a formulation of true human nature. Ideally, human
action should comport with the fullness of human knowledge. It is natural,
therefore, not strange, for lawyers to take lessons from literature.
Marijane Camilleri
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